About 60% of the US hospitals are not-for-profit and it is not clear how traditional theories of capital structure should be adapted to understand the borrowing behavior of not-for-profit hospitals. This paper identifies important determinants of capital structure taken from theories describing for-profit firms as well as prior literature on not-for-profit hospitals. We examine the differential effects these factors have on the capital structure of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals. Specifically, we use a difference-in-differences regression framework to study how differences in leverage between forprofit and not-for-profit hospitals change in response to key explanatory variables (i.e. tax rates and bankruptcy costs). The sample in this study includes most US short-term general acute hospitals from 2000 to 2012. We find that personal and corporate income taxes and bankruptcy costs have significant and distinct effects on the capital structure of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals. Specifically, relative to not-for-profit hospitals: (1) higher corporate income tax encourages for-profit hospitals to increase their debt usage; (2) higher personal income tax discourages for-profit hospitals to use debt; and (3) higher expected bankruptcy costs lead for-profit hospitals to use less debt. Over the past decade, the capital structure of forprofit hospitals has been more flexible as compared to that of not-for-profit hospitals. This may suggest that not-for-profit hospitals are more constrained by external financing resources. Particularly, our analysis suggests that not-for-profit hospitals operating in states with high corporate taxes but low personal income taxes may face particular challenges of borrowing funds relative to their for-profit competitors.
Introduction
In recent years, the hospital industry has faced mandates to increase investment in a variety of costly projects to support the transition to value-based care. These include pressures to adopt and implement costly new health information technology (HIT), integration strategies that may include acquiring physician practices or other providers, and construction of new outpatient and ambulatory care facilities. For these efforts to be successful, hospitals must be able to obtain the necessary financial capital.
As with all business organizations, hospitals must make careful choices regarding how much of their financial capital should come from sources of debt, such as bonds and bank loans and how much should come from sources of equity, such as the sale of stock offerings and internally generated cash flows. Both the factors that affect these choices and the ''capital structure'' outcomes of these choices are important to a hospital's ability to attract and obtain financial resources. 1 Beyond capital structure, these choices can also affect operational characteristics of hospitals. For instance, hospitals with more debt are also more likely to engage in ''up-coding'' claims for Medicare reimbursement.
Although for-profit (FP) firms have the clear imperative to maximize shareholder value, NFP firms' objective function, while different than that of the FP firm, is less clear. Prior literature has suggested that NFP firms maximize objectives from output 4 to physician incomes. 5 Regardless of differences between the objectives of FP and NFP organizations, the differences in ownership also have important implications for a hospital's financing choice between debt and equity. NFP organizations are prohibited from distributing assets to their owners and as a result, they are unable to attract equity financing from investors. Historically charitable donations have been an important financing alternative for NFP hospitals. However, in recent years, donations have become small and unreliable. 6, 7 Subsequently, NFP hospitals face constraints on their ability to raise capital that are unlike those faced by FP hospitals. Therefore, how capital structure determinants differ between FP and NFP hospitals is important to understand the relative ability of each type of hospital to pursue investment projects and deliver care. Ultimately, differences in the ability to attract capital may affect the ability of NFP hospitals to participate in the local markets. 8 The finance literature includes extensive research on corporate capital structures and their determinants. However, this literature focuses almost exclusively on FP firms and less is known about the determinants of capital structure in NFP hospitals. Among the few studies, one paper finds that NFP hospitals are more concerned than their FP counterparts with maintaining debt holdings at levels that preserve favorable credit ratings and future access to debt at low interest rates. 9 Yet, despite its significant role, there is little research examining the differential effects of tax subsidies offered for debt on capital structure of FP and NFP hospitals. FP and NFP hospitals receive tax subsidies in distinct ways. Due to the interest deductibility of debt in current tax policies, the interest expenses of debt financing can be used as tax shields to reduce income taxes in FP organizations. 10 However, the classical tax shield benefits do not extend to NFP hospitals due to their exemption from income tax. On the other hand, NFP hospitals also receive tax subsidies for debt issuance, though these tax subsidies take a different form than the tax subsidies available to FP hospitals. The ability to issue tax-exempt debt at below-market rates influences the capital structure of NFP hospitals by creating an incentive for some NFP hospitals to finance real investment with additional debt while investing retained earnings in financial securities. 11 As a result, we should expect differences in the debt subsidies available to FP and NFP hospitals to vary from state to state based on state-specific corporate and personal income tax rates. Our study uses these state-level differences to examine how taxes impact the decision of FP and NFP hospitals in using debt financing.
We will also study whether the expected bankruptcy costs have differential effects on capital structure of FP and NFP hospitals.
The role of taxes and bankruptcy in capital structure decisions Much of the capital structure literature focuses on the choice between debt and equity financing in a trade-off context. Traditionally, the primary benefit of debt comes from the tax savings due to the deductibility of interest. 12 That is, each dollar of interest paid on debt can be used to ''shield'' a dollar of income by reducing the amount of income subject to taxation. On the other hand, the primary cost of debt comes from expected costs of bankruptcy. 13, 14 The optimal capital structure is the leverage choice at which the marginal benefit of debt is completely offset by the marginal cost of financial distress.
Within the corporate sector, the literature finds a substantial link between debt choice and corporate tax rates and quantifies the impact of corporate taxes on firm value. [15] [16] [17] Specifically, as corporate tax rates increase, a profitable firm will be able to increase its tax savings using more debt financing, resulting in a higher firm value, all else equal. Recently, Binsbergen et al. 18, 19 estimate and quantify the cost and benefits of debt, arriving at an empirical model of optimal capital structure. Based on the literature, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: Relative to NFP hospitals, higher corporate taxes will be associated with greater use of debt among FP hospitals.
Although firms receive a direct benefit from using debt in the form of corporate tax shield, the personal taxes that a firm's creditors pay indirectly impact the firm's cost of debt. A higher personal income tax rate causes creditors pay higher taxes on the interest income received, and therefore demand for higher yields.
a Ultimately, the costs of personal taxes, borne by the debt investors, are passed along to the borrowing firm. Myers 20 proposes a model whereby the entire benefit of using debt from the corporate tax shield can be offset by high personal taxes. Graham 16 finds empirical support that a model with corporate tax shields that adjusts for personal tax penalty can explain firms' capital structure better.
Although higher personal tax rates serve to increase FP hospitals' cost of debt, NFP hospitals receive a subsidy for the portion of their debt that is ''tax-exempt'' and issued through municipal authorities. That is, the investors of tax-exempt debt are not taxed on the received interest income. As a result, individual investors are willing to accept a lower rate of return on the debt and hospitals benefit from a lower cost of borrowing.
b Therefore, the tax subsidy through tax-exempt debt is an important determinant of NFP hospitals' use of debt.
11,21 Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: Relative to NFP hospitals, higher personal tax rates will be negatively associated with leverage among FP hospitals.
In addition to taxes, the expected bankruptcy costs have been viewed as an important determinant of capital structure. As firms increase financial leverage, they also increase the probability of default and incur bankruptcy costs. These costs include the direct fees paid to lawyers, accountants, and other individuals involved in managing bankruptcy as well as indirect costs such as the loss of managerial time and focus and the loss of customers, suppliers, and employees. Earlier studies find that realized bankruptcy costs are relatively low, accounting from 3.1% to no more than 20% of firm value. 13, 22, 23 Given the low probability of default, 20 this suggests that expected bankruptcy costs are much lower (since they have both a low probability of being incurred and are relatively small conditional on being incurred). However, a recent study by Almeida and Philippon 14 suggests that ex-ante risk-adjusted costs of distress are higher than previously measured. That is, an additional dollar of money is valued more when kept or costs more when paid during distress times relative to during nondistressed times. As such, the expected costs of bankruptcy should reflect the change in the marginal value of money when entering the distress state. After this adjustment, expected bankruptcy costs can be as high as 9% of firm value for investment-grade firms and much higher for speculative grade firms. Because the government often intervenes to save NFP hospitals from closure, we expect the bankruptcy risk more relevant to FP hospitals. 24 This leads to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Relative to NFP hospitals, a higher bankruptcy risk is associated with lower debt usage for FP hospitals.
Methods Data
We extract hospital characteristics and financial information for the period from 2000 to 2012 from the Medicare Hospital Cost Reports that are collected by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. To ensure the comparability among hospitals, we restrict the sample to short-term, general acute care hospitals. We exclude government-owned hospitals from the sample, retaining only FP and NFP hospitals. In addition, we restrict our sample to only the hospitals without missing values on debt levels and control variables. Because we study oneyear forward debt levels, we require hospitals to have two consecutive years of nonmissing data. Finally, we restrict our sample to hospitals with more than 25 beds because smaller hospitals are likely to have different financing strategies as a result of their size or a critical access designation that affords them cost-based reimbursement for capital. 25 Altogether, we end with a sample of 24,931 hospital-year observations. Overall, the size of our sample is consistent with previous studies that also use Medicare Cost Reports. [25] [26] [27] Next, we obtain and merge in state-level tax information. We collect state-level corporate and personal income tax rates during the period between 2000 and 2012 from the Tax Foundation.
c Where relevant, d we use the top income bracket of corporate and personal tax rates as they best reflect the marginal tax rates that affect hospitals.
Measures
Our main variable of interest is the hospital's capital structure, defined as the amount of leverage (debt) used to finance the hospital's assets. We use three different measures of leverage: the total debt-to-assets ratio, the long-term debt-to-assets ratio, and the short-term debtto-assets ratio. Long-term debt includes mortgage payable, long-term notes payable, and unsecured loans. Short-term debt includes short-term notes and loans payable. Total debt is the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt. Among these, we focus on the longterm debt-to-assets ratio. This measure is most likely to capture strategic, long-term differences in hospitals' capital structure decisions rather than changes in short-term debt holdings necessary to bridge shortfalls in working capital. This is consistent with existing theories of capital structure in which much of the tax benefit of debt comes from the tax shields afforded by interest payments on long-term debt.
The tax benefits of debt are measured using state corporate and personal tax rates. We use the top tax rates because they are the rates that will determine the marginal benefit afforded by interest deductions. On the other hand, we proxy for bankruptcy risk using an adjusted version of Altman's Z score e,13 that better fits privately held and NFP hospitals. It can be defined as follows:
Altman's Z score is increasing in financial health and decreasing with financial distress. That is, the lower the Z score, the riskier the financial condition of the organization.
In addition to our main explanatory variables, we also include important hospital-level control variables, including hospital size-as measured by the number of beds and the log of total assets, and return on assets (ROA). We include the cash-to-asset ratio and long-term investments-to-asset ratio to control for the differences in cash and long-term investment holdings, respectively. Our cash variable includes both cash on hand and short-term investment. As both cash and long-term investment can be used to evaluate a hospital's liquidity position and creditworthiness, they should affect its ability to raise debt capital. 28 We also interact the cash and long-term investment controls with the binary variable indicating FP status to capture the possibility that NFP hospitals manage cash and investments differently than their FP counterparts.
Regression model
We use a difference-in-differences regression framework as our main analytic approach. This approach estimates differential changes in leverage between FP and NFP, in response to the changes of key explanatory variables (i.e. tax rates and bankruptcy costs). Our dependent variable is the one-year forward debt ratio. Using the one-year forward debt ratio as our dependent variable allows us to include current debt ratio as an explanatory variable. As a hospital's capital structure may be path dependent, controlling for current debt ratios captures any prior decisions leading up to the existing debt levels and accounts for the possible reverse causality that the current debt level may affect hospital control variables. We interact the binary variable indicating a hospital's FP status with our corporate tax, personal income tax, and expected bankruptcy cost variables, respectively. The estimated coefficients of these interaction terms provide empirical evidence of differences between FP and NFP hospitals' responses to difference in corporate tax rates, personal tax rates, and bankruptcy costs. All models include state and year indicators to control for the state-and year-fixed effects. The regression model can be described in the following equation
where D i,tþ1 includes a set of one-year forward debt ratios and CT, PT, and ZS represent for corporate tax, personal tax, and Z score, respectively. The variables of our interests are the three interaction terms such as FPxCT, FPxPT, and FPxZS. If the coefficients of the three interaction terms ( 4 , 5 , 6 ) are statistically significant, the empirical results will support the hypothesis that tax rates and bankruptcy costs have differential effects on FP and NFP hospitals' capital structure. Hosp i,t is a set of hospital-level control variables, including the hospital size, profitability, and cash and investment levels. and are state-and year-fixed effects. 2 i,t is the error term for hospital i at year t.
Results

Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 . Panel A and Panel B show the summary statistics for FP and NFP hospitals. Panel C provides a t test of means between the two groups. As shown in Panel C, NFP hospitals are larger and on average have US$119.6 m more in assets than their FP counterparts. The average long-term debt-to-asset ratio of a NFP hospital is 25.5%, whereas that of the FP hospital is 28.5%. Consistent with the literature, 29 NFP hospitals on average hold higher percentage of their assets in cash and long-term investments (10.0 and 13.1%, respectively) than FP hospitals (4.0 and 2.0%, respectively). NFP hospitals also have significantly lower ROA, suggesting lower profitability and potentially less efficient capital allocation. Figure 1 graphs the time trends of the average longterm debt leverage ratio between NFP and FP hospitals. We find that over time, NFP hospitals' leverage ratios are generally more stable than those of FP hospitals. This pattern is mostly striking when FP hospitals gradually reduce their debt usage in recent years and yet the debt level is relative the same for hospitals over the period.
Main regression results
In Table 2 , we present the results for the effects of corporate taxes, personal taxes, and the adjusted Altman's Z score on hospital capital structure. Our variables of interests are the interaction terms between FP status and corporate tax, personal tax, and Z score. For completeness, we present the results for total-debt, long-term debt, and short-term debt ratios. To be consistent with capital structure literature, our interpretation focuses on column (2) which uses the long-term debt ratio as the outcome variable. Overall, we find evidence consistent with all three of our hypothesis described in Section 2. First, we find that, relative to NFP hospitals, FP hospitals are significantly more likely to increase debt when corporate tax rate is higher. As expected, the coefficient of the interaction term between FP and corporate tax rate to be positive and statistically significant. That is, when the corporate tax rate increases by 1 percentage point, the long-term debt-to-asset ratio of FP hospitals will increase by 0.22 percentage point more than that of the NFP hospitals in the next year. The result is consistent with Hypothesis 1-FP hospitals would increase their use of debt to capitalize on the tax deduction of interest expense. Interestingly, when we examine short-term debt-to-assets in column (3), the interaction Panel A presents the summary statistics for sample of not-for-profit general short-term hospitals and Panel B presents the summary statistics for the sample of for-profit general short-term hospitals. Panel C provides the t test difference of means between the characteristics of not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level ***Significant at the 1% level.
term of FP and corporate tax rate is significant and negative, with a much smaller magnitude. These results suggest that FP hospitals are switching out of shortterm debt in favor of long-term debt to benefit from higher expected tax shields. Second, relative to NFP hospitals, FP hospitals are likely to decrease the use of debt when the state personal tax is higher. When the personal tax rate increases by 1 percentage point, the long-term debt-asset ratio of FP hospitals will decrease by 0.31 percentage point more than that of the NFP hospitals in the next year. Consistent with the result of corporate taxes, in column (3), the personal tax rate has the opposite effect on short-term debt suggesting that FP hospitals are likely to use more short-term debt because a higher personal tax rate makes long-term debt more costly.
Third, we find that relative to NFP hospitals, FP hospitals increase their leverage as bankruptcy risk declines, consistent with Hypothesis 3. Note that the variable of interest is the interaction term between FP and adjusted Z score. The higher Z score suggests lower bankruptcy risks and lower expected bankruptcy costs. We find the coefficient to be positive and statistically significant regardless using total debt, long-term debt, or short-term debt as the outcome variable. This suggests that relative to NFP hospitals, FP hospitals are more sensitive in decreasing leverage in response to increases in expected bankruptcy costs.
Prior, during, and post financial crisis
Although our study takes advantage of a longer 13-year period from 2000 to 2012, it encompasses the financial crisis period that may have significantly altered and changed the capital supply in the credit markets as well as hospitals' preferences toward debt financing. To examine the potential for regime shifts around the financial crisis, we stratify our sample into three subperiods: (1) We rerun the regression analysis in equation (1) and present the results in Table 3 . Again, we focus on the long-term debt ratio (column (2)). We find that the implications for the effect of taxes and bankruptcy costs on long-term debt ratios are largely consistent with the findings from our full sample. We lose the significance of the interaction term of FP status and corporate tax rate potentially due to smaller sample size. In addition, we find that the magnitudes of tax and bankruptcy cost effects are larger and more significant in the pre-and during-crisis periods (from 2000 to 2009) and diminish in the post-crisis period (from 2010). Column (1) uses total debt to total assets as the dependent variable; column (2) uses long-term debt to total assets; and column (3) uses short-term debt to total assets. For-profit is a binary variable that takes the value 1 for for-profit hospitals and 0 for nonprofit hospitals. Log (Num. of beds) is the natural log of the number of available hospital beds. Log (Total assets) is the natural log of the total assets of the hospital. We use both fiscal year-fixed effects and state-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state levels and are reported in the parentheses. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.
System affiliation
Because system-affiliated hospitals may have better access to capital markets and corporate headquarters may raise capital for reallocation to individual hospitals, we stratify our sample by chain affiliation and repeat our analysis. Within our sample, 13,077 hospital-year observations are identified as being affiliated with hospital systems and 10,504 observations operate independently. The results are presented in Table 4 . Overall, our main effects hold for both hospitals affiliated with chains and those operate independently. The differential effect of corporate taxes loses significance in the system sample, whereas the effect of the Z score loses significance in the independent hospital sample. This could be due to system-affiliated hospitals having internal capital markets among their sibling Column (1) uses total debt to total assets as the dependent variable; column (2) uses long-term debt to total assets; and column (3) uses short-term debt to total assets. For-profit is a binary variable that takes the value 1 for for-profit hospitals and 0 for nonprofit hospitals. Log (Num. of beds) is the natural log of the number of available hospital beds. Log (Total assets) is the natural log of the total assets of the hospital. We use both fiscal year-fixed effects and state-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state levels and are reported in the parentheses. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level. Column (1) uses total debt to total assets as the dependent variable; column (2) uses long-term debt to total assets; and column (3) uses short-term debt to total assets. For-profit is a binary variable that takes the value 1 for for-profit hospitals and 0 for nonprofit hospitals. Log (Num. of beds) is the natural log of the number of available hospital beds. Log (Total assets) is the natural log of the total assets of the hospital. We use both fiscal year-fixed effects and state-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state levels and are reported in the parentheses. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.
facilities that operate beyond state borders. Thus, their capital structure is less sensitive to the state corporate and personal tax rates than that of independent hospitals. Despite the differences in the magnitudes, this subsample analysis shows that the direction of effects is consistent with the hypothesis and main results. In Table 5 , we show how we constructed the financial variables from Medicare Cost Reports. Table 6 and 7 provide detailed information of corporate and individual taxes during our study period.
Discussion
Our paper shows that there are important differences between the capital structure theories tailored to FP firms and the factors that affect the capital structure of 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 WV 7.8 8. .0 6.0 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 10. NFP hospitals. Corporate tax, personal income tax, and costs of financial distress all have distinct effects on FP and NFP hospitals. Moreover, differences between state-level personal and corporate income tax rates could create differences in the ability of NFP and FP hospitals to raise debt. Our estimates suggest these differences may be relatively small, but that they lead to noticeable changes in hospitals' capital structures. While our results confirm that the determinants of capital structure differ across FP and NFP hospitals, the results are also unexpected in two ways. First, we did not find a relationship between personal tax rates and NFP leverage. One possibility is that tax-exempt debt may not play a vital role in determining total debt for the average NFP hospital. Some forms of debt (e.g. mortgage debt or bank loans) do not qualify for tax exemption. Moreover, tax-exempt financing is only available for projects that are deemed to further a hospital's NFP mission; many projects like the purchase of physician practices or investments in HIT may not qualify for tax-exempt financing.
Second, it is puzzling that NFP hospitals do not reduce the debt usage as the likelihood of bankruptcy increases. One plausible explanation for our observed (lack of) result is that our adjusted Z score does not fully capture the bankruptcy risks of NFP hospitals. Alternatively, NFP hospitals have limited access to equity, and therefore, even when costs of financial distress increase, NFP hospitals may have more difficulty reducing their use of debt than FP hospitals. Finally, NFP hospitals in financial distress may be better able to solicit financial resources from charitable donors or local governments, diminishing the effectiveness of traditional bankruptcy likelihood measures, such as Z score.
A primary limitation of this study is the lack of detailed financial data for hospitals. Unlike public corporations that are legally obligated to file audited annual and quarterly reports to the Security Exchange Commission hospital financial information provided in the Medicare Cost Report is limited and less detailed. For example, information regarding hospital cash flows; earnings before interest, depreciation, and amortization; and retained earnings are frequently unavailable, preventing more robust analyses. We also acknowledge the possible endogeneity between state tax rates and other factors associated with debt issuance. For instance, it is possible that states with higher tax rates tend to be more supportive of issuing tax-exempt bonds or perhaps more generous in funding programs such as Medicaid that affect hospitals' revenues. Additionally, because debt may be issued or held at the corporate level, future research includes information of chain-wide debt issuance and the allocation of debt and equity among sibling hospitals will be warranted.
Implication and conclusion
Our analysis suggests that disparities in tax subsidies for debt between FP and NFP hospitals are likely especially large in states with high corporate and low personal tax rates. To the degree that NFP hospitals face limitations on their ability to raise equity, a limited use of debt may equate to a limited ability to access external capital.
All else equal, NFP hospitals operating in states where there are low personal and high corporate taxes may face challenges in attempting to compete with FP hospitals in developing capital-intensive strategies such as investments in new ambulatory facilities or implementation of HIT. NFP hospitals struggling in such situations may consider partnerships or joint ventures with bettercapitalized FP partners. For example, Duke-Lifepoint partnership has made acquisitions in Michigan (Marquette Regional Medical Center) and Pennsylvania (Conemaugh Health System), both of which are states with relatively large differences in personal and corporate tax rates. To ensure patient safety and adequate investment in hospital care, the partnership between FP and NFP hospitals may provide an alternative approach to ease stricter external financial constraints faced by the NFP hospitals.
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